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Setting aside default judgment – whether judgment regularly or irregularly 
entered – service under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s109X(1) – UCPR r 120 – 
requirements for affidavit of service 
In Hill v Robertson Suspension Systems Pty Ltd [2009] QDC 165 McGill DCJ 
considered the procedural requirements for the service of originating process on a 
company, and for proving that service for the purpose of obtaining default judgment. 
Facts 
A default judgment was signed by the Deputy Registrar on 20 March 2009. The 
defendant applied on 11 May 2009 to set aside the default judgment. 
No notice of intention to defend had been filed on behalf of the defendant at the time 
when the default judgment was entered, and the time allowed under r 137 of the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) for the filing of the notice of intention 
to defend had expired.  In determining whether the default judgment had been regularly 
entered it was, however, necessary to examine whether the plaintiff had duly 
established that the defendant had been properly served with the claim and statement 
of claim. 
Legislation 
UCPR r 282 provides: 
 “A plaintiff must prove service of a claim on a defendant in default before 
judgment may be given under this division against the defendant.” 
UCPR r 107 provides:  
“A document required to be served personally on a corporation must be served in 
the way provided for the service of documents under the Corporations Act or 
another applicable law.” 
Section 109X(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) provides, in relevant 
respects: 
  “For the purposes of any law, a document may be served on a company by: 
(a) leaving it at, or posting it to, the company’s registered office …” 
Section 142 of the Act provides, in relevant respects: 
 “(1) A company must have a registered office in this jurisdiction… 
(2) A company must lodge notice of a change of address of its registered office 
with ASIC not later than 28 days after the date on which the change occurs…” 
UCPR r 120 provides, so far as relevant:  
 
120(1) If an affidavit of service of a document is required under these rules or an 
Act or law, the affidavit— 
(a) for an affidavit of personal service—must be made by the person who 
served the document and include the following— 
… 
 (b) otherwise— 
(i) must state the relevant dates and the facts showing service; and 
(ii) may be made on information given to, or the belief of, the person 
causing the service; and 
(iii) if made on information given to the person—must state the source of 
the information. 
Analysis 
McGill DCJ acknowledged that a claim is a document ordinarily required to be served 
personally (UCPR r 105). His Honour noted, however, that the effect of r 107 was that if 
a document otherwise required to be served has to be served on a company, it must be 
served in a way provided under the Act. The judge said that r 107 did not require that 
the document be served personally, and also that the Act does not speak of personal 
service. It followed that it was unnecessary for an affidavit of service to comply with r 
120(1)(a), but that it must comply with paragraph (b). 
In light of the terms of s 142 of the Act, McGill DCJ found that for practical purposes the 
registered office for the purpose of s 109X was the place shown as the registered office 
in the records of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), an 
address which could be ascertained by a search of the records of ASIC.  
This meant that when service was by posting  to the registered office of a company, the 
way to state “the facts showing service” as required by r 120(1)(b)(i) of the UCPR  was 
to prove that the documents were sent by post to a particular address, and that that 
address was the registered office of the company. 
The affidavit of service upon which the plaintiff had relied in seeking default judgment 
deposed to the service of the claim by posting a copy “by prepaid post addressed to the 
defendants address for service at…” The judge found the reference to “address for 
service” to be inappropriate, as the defendant had not filed a notice of intention to 
defend, nor filed a separate address for service. This meant the defendant necessarily 
did not have an address for service, so the affidavit was inadequate and the judgment 
had been irregularly entered. 
In these circumstances it was not necessary to decide whether an affidavit which states 
only that a particular address is the registered office of the company is sufficient. McGill 
DCJ nevertheless proceeded to express his view that it was difficult to see how such an 
affidavit would comply with the requirements of r 120(1)(b)(iii).  
 
He said it would be rare for a deponent to have personal knowledge of the location of 
the registered office of the defendant company. In such a case there was no strict 
compliance with a relevant rule, and default judgment should not be given.”  In his 
Honour’s view, the best method of proving service in compliance with s 109X(1)(a) was 
to exhibit a copy of the ASIC search which revealed the registered office of the 
company.  
 
He  accepted, however, that r120(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the UCPR meant that the need to 
produce a copy of the ASIC search could be avoided by the deponent deposing to the 
location of the registered office of the company and stating that the source of that 
information was an ASIC search.  
 
McGill DCJ also considered whether the default judgment should be set aside in any 
event on the basis that there was a defence on the merits. There was argument in this 
respect that the amount stated as owing was not in fact owing.  His Honour said it was 
necessary in this context to draw a distinction between a situation in which there was a 
dispute as to the amount owing, where the judgment may be regular, and one where the 
judgment was for a sum which the plaintiff knew or ought to have known was not owing, 
which will be irregular: Cusack v de Angelis [2007] QCA 713 at [43].  
Though not making a finding that the judgment was irregular, McGill DCJ concluded 
after examination of the material filed on behalf of the parties that the defendant may 
well have at least an arguable case that not all of the amounts claimed were owing. He 
concluded that if it was necessary for the defendant to establish a defence on the merits 
to the requisite standard (which he noted was not very high on an application to set 
aside a default judgment) that the material before him was sufficient to do that. 
The judge was satisfied the default judgment should be set aside, and he ordered 
accordingly. As he had determined that the judgment had been irregularly entered, he 
ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs of the application. 
Comment 
As was submitted to the judge in the course of argument, it is not uncommon in practice 
for solicitors to depose to service on a corporation at its registered office, without 
exhibiting a copy of an ASIC search to demonstrate the location of the registered office. 
The judge also acknowledged in the course of his judgment that his own investigations 
suggested that some deputy registrars had accepted the bald statement in an affidavit 
of service that a particular address is the address of the registered office of the 
company.   
The judge’s views adopt a strict and technical construction of the requirements for an 
affidavit of service under r 120(1)(b). Though clearly obiter, they may well affect the 
approach taken on applications to enter or set aside default judgments in the lower 
courts.  
Pending further judicial consideration of the issue,  it is suggested the prudent course is 
to ensure that the deponent of an affidavit for service effected under s 109X(1)(a) of the 
Act deposes not only to the location of the registered office of the company but also, at 
a minimum, provides the source of that information.  
 
 
 
 
 
